Abstract We initiate the study of mechanism design without money for common goods. Our model captures a variation of the well-known one-dimensional facility location problem if the facility is assumed to have a capacity constraint k < n where n is the population size. This new model introduces a richer game-theoretic context compared to the classical facility location, or public goods, problem. Our key result contributes a novel perspective relating to the "major open question" (Barbarà et al., 1998) posed by Border and Jordan (1983) by showing the equivalence of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) mechanisms for common goods and the family of Generalized Median Mechanisms (GMMs). This equivalence does not hold in the public goods setting and, by situating GMMs in this broader game-theoretic context, is the first complete characterization of GMMs in terms of purely strategic properties. We then characterize lower bounds of the welfare approximation ratio across all DIC mechanisms and identify a DIC mechanism which attains this lower bound when k < ⌈(n + 1)/2⌉ and k = n. Finally, we analyze the approximation ratio when the property of DIC is weakened to ex post incentive compatibility.
Introduction
Mechanism design without money has been intensely studied by both the economics and computer science communities. This research effort has led to many celebrated results which address market failures in environments where the use of money is unlawful (e.g., organ donations) and/or considered unethical (e.g., political decision making). Some well-known studies include markets with private goods (excludable and rival 1 ) such as kidney exchanges (Ashlagi and Roth, 2011; Roth et al., 2007) and school allocations (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003; Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2005) , and also markets with public goods (non-excludable and non-rival) (Black, 1948; Moulin, 1980; Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2013) .
The provision of public goods without money continues to be an active area of research with supermarkets, parks, libraries and schools cited as canonical public goods; however, the non-rivalrous property of each of these goods is debatable when noting the ubiquity of capacity constraints. For example due to limited products, space, desks, or seats, an agent's utility from using each of the canonical public goods may be diminished. That is to say, the goods have a threshold-rivalrous property. 2 The presence of capacity constraints are particularly evident in context where demand frequently exceeds supply such as the provision of facilities in high density cities, and social housing. Thus, it is arguably more natural to consider the mechanism design problem with capacity-constrained public goods, or in other words common goods (non-excludable and threshold-rivalrous).
This paper initiates the study of mechanism design without money for common goods. We focus on the problem faced by a social planner deciding where to locate a capacity constrained good, or facility, based on the reports of selfish agents with private information. The introduction of capacity constraints into the mechanism design problem induces a new strategic environment where a second-stage extensive form game is generated. This causes an interdependence between agent utilities due to only a limited number of agents being able to be 'serviced' by the facility. The extensive form game arises since given any location which the mechanism may output, agents will then strategically choose whether or not to attempt to be serviced by the facility based on its anticipated capacity. For example, if the facility is at capacity negative utility is experienced by the agent attempting but failing to be serviced by the facility, whilst if the agent does not attempt to be serviced by the facility their utility is zero (e.g., outside option).
In contrast to the public goods mechanism design problem, the optimal (welfare maximal) solution to the common goods problem cannot be implemented via a strategyproof -neither dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) nor ex post incentive compatible (ex post IC) -mechanism.
3 Thus, following the research direction initiated by Procaccia and Tennenholtz (2013) we pursue "approximation...to obtain strategyproofness without resorting to payments"; see also Dekel et al. (2010) ; Meir et al. (2010 Meir et al. ( , 2012 .
Our main focus is on characterizing the family of DIC mechanisms, and minimizing the (worst-case) approximation ratio between the welfare attained by the optimal solution and the welfare attainable via a DIC mechanism. However, we also analyze an ex post IC mechanism to show that large improvements in the approximation ratio can be attained for capacity ranges k ≤ 1 8 (1 + √ 17) n. 4 In addition, we consider the related mechanism design problem (again without money) where the common good can be made excludable. That is, whilst simultaneously choosing a location for the facility (based on the reports of agents) we also restrict access of the facility to certain subsets of agents, say via permits or personal identification.
Contributions This paper introduces a new mechanism design problem without money for common goods which is applicable to settings where goods are thresholdrivalrous (i.e., capacity constrained). The formalization of the model involves analyzing an extensive form game and solving for the (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium. The equilibrium solution highlights an interdependence between agent utilities which must be accounted for by the mechanism designer. This interdependence of utilities does not exist in the public goods setting.
Our key results include the following:
(i) Leveraging the powerful result of Border and Jordan (1983) , we characterize all DIC mechanisms via the family of Generalized Median Mechanisms (GMMs) and provide a lower bound on the approximation ratio for all capacity constraint ranges. (ii) We show that the (standard) median mechanism provides the minimal approximation ratio among all DIC mechanisms for capacity ranges k < ⌈(n + 1)/2⌉ and k = n, where n is the number of agents. (iii) We introduce a mechanism which is ex post IC but not DIC which provides a strictly lower approximation ratio compared to any DIC mechanisms for capacity ranges k < 1 8 (1 + √ 17) n. (iv) We show that the related mechanism design problem where the good can be made excludable (say via permits) leads to the impossibility of an ex post IC (let alone DIC) mechanism when combined with a weak anonymity property.
We highlight that, by situating GMMs in this broader game-theoretic context with a threshold-rivalrous good, result (i) is the first complete characterization of GMMs in terms of purely strategic properties. This result contributes a novel perspective relating to the "major open question" (Barbarà et al., 1998) posed by Border and Jordan (1983) (to be discussed in the following section). Other known characterizations are in terms of properties such as the uncompromising property, phantom voters and a closed graph property (see Theorem 5 and Remark 4). Furthermore, the result shows that the key strategic property (DIC) of GMMs is robust to capacity constraints, and so the family of GMMs can be interpreted as the complete family of capacity-robust-DIC mechanisms. As will be shown this is not true in general for mechanisms which are DIC in the uncapacitated setting.
Related literature
A number of papers have considered mechanism design without money (Ashlagi and Roth, 2011; Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003; Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2013; Moulin, 1980; Border and Jordan, 1983; Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975; Sui and Boutilier, 2015; Mei et al., 2016) . Most closely related to our paper is one such paper by Procaccia and Tennenholtz (2013) , where agents with single-peaked preferences are dispersed along the real line and the problem of locating a public good (e.g., a facility) is studied with the goal of minimizing two distinct objective functions; the total social cost and the maximum social cost. This problem is often referred to as a single facility location problem, or single facility location game. In this paper we focus on minimizing the first objective function in the new environment where the good to be located is non-excludable but is threshold-rivalrous. This models settings where the good is capacity constrained and hence our work can be thought of as a capacitated single facility location problem. 5 In contrast to the setting studied by Procaccia and Tennenholtz (2013) agent utilities are not independent and are not (strictly) single-peaked. 6 Thus, the results of Moulin (1980) ; Border and Jordan (1983) are no longer immediately applicable, and a range of distinct results are attained. Furthermore, the interdependence of utilities means that the ex post IC property may be strictly weaker than the DIC property; in the setting considered by Procaccia and Tennenholtz (2013) these two properties are equivalent.
Another large body of literature has been concerned with characterizing dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) mechanisms for locating public goods in Euclidean space when preferences are restricted (say for example single-peaked). The key pioneering works in this area are by Moulin (1980) and Border and Jordan (1983) . In one-dimensional space, Border and Jordan identify a general class of mechanisms (or voting rules) which have become to be known as generalized median mechanisms (GMM) that are DIC, and show that when the property of unanimity is enforced every DIC mechanism is a GMM. These results extend the characterizations found in Moulin (1980) . In multi-dimensional space Border and Jordan show that a mechanism is DIC and unanimity respecting if and only if the j-th component of the mechanism coincides with a (one-dimensional) GMM which operates on the profile corresponding to the j-th component of each agent's report. Characterizing DIC but non-unanimity respecting mechanisms was proposed as an open problem; indeed, 5 We do not review a large segment of computer science and operations research literature on facility location problems which assumes complete information and hence does not require a mechanism design approach to overcome strategic tensions (for an extensive survey see Brandeau and Chiu (1989) ). Instead we focus on the subset of literature which assumes strategic agents and takes a mechanism design approach to the problem. 6 In fact the preference will be interdependent and weakly single-peaked. (Barbarà et al., 1998) with only partial progress towards a resolution (Ching, 1997; Barbarà et al., 1998; Peremans et al., 1997; Weymark, 2011) . In this paper we focus on the one-dimensional case where open questions still remain; in particular, the results of Border and Jordan (1983) in one-dimensional space leaves two gaps:
(i) there exists (non-unanimity respecting) DIC mechanisms which are not GMM, and (ii) there exists DIC mechanism which are GMMs but do not respect unanimity.
Our results contribute to filling these gaps which we believe will be a useful contribution to the more general multi-dimensional open problem. We characterize precisely the complete set of GMMs as the family of mechanisms which are DIC when the public good is capacity constrained (or threshold-rivalrous). Thus, we characterize the mechanisms in the gap (ii) identified above. One interpretation of our result is that GMMs are equivalent to the family of capacity-robust-DIC mechanisms since for any capacity constraint (including no capacity constraint) these mechanisms are DIC. Thus, our results also show that the mechanisms in gap (i) are not capacityrobust-DIC.
In addition to the common good mechanism design problem where the good is assumed to be non-excludable, we consider the related problem with an excludable, and still capacity constrained good. That is, we allow the mechanism to not only output a location for the good but also dictate which subset of the agents (based on their reports) can access the limited capacity of the good, say via the use of permits. This related problem combines two strands of literature; the mechanism design literature on facility location problems (as discussed in the previous paragraph), and the mechanism design literature on assignment (or one-sided matching) problems without money. The assignment problem faced in our setting differs however, to the standard literature on assignment/matching problems since all agents weakly prefer to be assigned to the (single) facility than not, and the total number of agents (i.e. demand) exceeds the capacity of the facility (i.e. supply). This immediately implies the nonexistence of anonymous strategyproof assignment mechanisms since any unassigned agent has a strict incentive to mimic the report of an assigned agent.
7 Nonetheless, we highlight recent work by Caragiannis et al. (2016) which contributes to the latter strand in the case where there are multiple capacity-constrained facilities (with locations exogenously given) and total supply exceeds demand. The authors view the facility-assignment problem as a matching problem in a metric space, and provide an analysis of the Serial Dictatorship and Random Serial Dictatorship mechanisms. In contrast our interest when considering an extension to excludable goods is in both the (simultaneous) location and assignment problem.
There are few papers which consider the combined location and assignment problem. We do however, mention the work of Jackson and Nicolò (2004) which considers the problem of providing an excludable, but not capacity constrained, public good where agent preferences are affected by the number of other users via congestion or crowding preferences. The authors utilise results from Moulin (1980) to characterize a subset of strategyproof mechanisms which satisfy additional properties, and show in many cases an incompatibility between strategyproofness and these properties. Despite the setting studied by Jackson and Nicolò omitting the capacity constraints considered in this paper, we similarly find an incompatibility when combining the location and assignment problem.
Model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of n agents and let X = [0, 1] be the domain of agent locations. We denote the single facility (or good) by S which is assumed to have capacity constraint k ≤ n; that is, the facility S can service at most k agents. When k = n the problem reduces to the classical, or uncapacitated, setting studied by Procaccia and Tennenholtz (2013) , if k < n we refer to the problem as the capacitated problem (this setting has not been studied previously in the literature). For each agent i ∈ N, her true location is denoted by x i ∈ X, and the profile of agents' true locations is denoted by x ∈ n i=1 X. We assume that initially that agent locations are only privately known, but once a facility location is chosen agent locations are common knowledge among agents.
We consider the problem of locating the facility S along the line X to maximize the total sum of utilities, or social welfare (defined formally later), subject to the capacity constraint k and based only on the profile of agent reported locations.
We denote an agent i's reported location byx i which need not equal her true location x i . The profile of reports is denoted byx ∈ n i=1 X. As usual, we denote the profile of reports excluding agent i's report byx −i ∈ j i X.
A mechanism is a function
which takes as an input the profile of reports and outputs a location for the facility.
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Once a facility location s ∈ X is chosen a complete information simultaneous move game Γ x (s) (to be described below) in induced between the agents which depends on both s and x. Further, since the profile of agent reportsx first determines s = M(x) the mechanism introduces an extensive form game. We emphasize that at the reporting stage, i.e., prior to a facility location being chosen, agents and the mechanism designer do not know the profile of true locations x. However, once the mechanism outputs a facility location s the profile x is common knowledge to all agents. As will be shown, this simplifying and stylized assumption ensures that all equilibria of the subgame are payoff equivalent and leads to the intuitive equilibrium where the k-closest agents are serviced by the facility. The simultaneous move game, Γ x (s), is described as follows: Given the true location of all agents x, each agent i ∈ N chooses an action a i from the action set A i = {∅, s}. We allow for the possibility that agents play mixed strategies, denoted by σ i . The action a i = s denotes agent i's choice to travel to the facility location s, and action a i = ∅ denotes the agent's decision to not travel to the location.
We assume that the facility services agents via a 'first-come-first-serve' basis (to be explained), with the set of serviced agents denoted by N * (s). Only agents whose chosen action was to travel to the facility location, i.e., N(s) := {i ∈ N : a i = s}, can be possibly serviced by the facility. Thus, the set of serviced agents is a subset of N(s); that is, N * (s) ⊆ N(s). If |N(s)| ≤ k then the entire set of agent traveling to the facility location s are serviced and N * (s) = N(s). Otherwise, applying a 'firstcome-first-serve' like-principle we assume that the k-closest agents within N(s) with respect to Euclidean distance are serviced with ties broken via some deterministic and commonly known priority ordering (⊲) over agents.
Given the above definition of N * (s), agent utilities are defined as
where ½ A denotes the indicator function and d(w, z) is the (one-dimensional) Eu-
Note that an agent choosing a i = ∅ always attain zero utility, any serviced agent attain non-negative utility (1−d(s, x i ) ≥ 0), and agents who are not serviced but choose to travel to the facility location attain nonpositive utility (−d(s, x i ) ≤ 0).
Remark 1 Our equilibria and characterization results are robust to other utility specifications. In particular, we only require that (i) a serviced agent has single peaked preferences over the facility location and always attains utility weakly larger than the outside option utility; and (ii) the outside option utility is weakly larger than that attained by an unserviced agent with action a i = s.
For example if
for some agent-specific quasi-metric δ i (·, ·) and constant c i such that max s,x i δ i (s, x i ) ≤ c i our results continue to hold. 9 Similarly, if an unserviced agent attempting to be serviced experiences some distance-independent cost ε i > 0, i.e.,
A quasi-metric is a metric function where the symmetry condition is not required to hold. the results also continue to hold. The latter formulation may be more appropriate for settings where the 'location' of the facility s ∈ X = [0, 1] corresponds to the quality, or type, of good and so an unserviced agent's utility is unrelated to the 'distance' between s and x i . In contrast however, we note that our welfare results are indeed dependent on the specifications of the utility function.
Returning to the mechanism designer's problem, without knowing the profile of agent locations x the designer must anticipate the game Γ x (s) when choosing a facility location s = M(x). We assume that the agents only play strategy profiles which constitutes Nash equilibria and hence lead to equilibrium assignments of agents to the facility. Fortunately, we have the following result showing the existence of a pure Nash equilibria, the equivalence of agent utilities across all (mixed) equilibria and hence the equivalence of social welfare across all (mixed) equilibria for any s and any x. This means that the mechanism designer can assume without loss of generality that the pure Nash equilibria described in the proposition is played in the induced game Γ x (s). Furthermore, given a profile x and location s, each agent's equilibrium utility from Γ x (s) is well-defined. Collectively, these results greatly simplifies the designer's problem.
We now present the results but delay the proofs to the appendix.
Proposition 1 Let x be the profile of agent locations, let s ∈ X be the facility location, and let N * denote the k-closest agents to s (tie-breaking via ⊲ if necessary). There exists a (pure) Nash equilibrium a
* to the game Γ x (s) with a * i = s for all i ∈ N * , and a * i = ∅ otherwise.
Theorem 1 For each agent i ∈ N, letū i denote their utility in the equilibrium a
* from Proposition 1. Every (mixed) Nash equilibrium σ * gives agent i utilityū i and hence produces the same social welfare; that is,
The two previous results lead immediately to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Let x be the profile of agent locations and let s ∈ X be the facility location. Every equilibrium σ * of the game Γ x (s) maximizes n i=1 u i across all agentto-facility assignments, or allocations, which satisfy the capacity constraint of the facility.
Given the above results it is clear that an agent utility depends not only on her location x i and the facility location s but also on the location of other agents' x −i . At the reporting stage, the location of other agents' x −i is not known and so neither is her utility. Thus, we derive agent preferences ( i ) over locations (at the reporting stage) which are independent of the location of other agents -in particular, this means that the preferences are robust to any belief of x −i . Abusing notation slightly, given an agent i ∈ N and profile of true locations x we denote the equilibrium utility of agent i in the game Γ x (s) by u i (s, x).
Definition 1 (Agent preferences under incomplete information) An agent i ∈ N located at x i , prefers facility location s over s ′ if
We denote this preference relation by i . The strict (indifference) preference relation ≻ i (∼ i ) is attained when strict equality (equality) holds.
We now show that agent preferences are weakly single-peaked. The proof is delayed to the appendix.
Proposition 2 Let i ∈ N be an agent with true location x i . It follows that (i) for any s
≤ s ′ ≤ x i s ′ i s, (ii) for any x i ≤ s ′ ≤ s s ′ i s.
Thus, i forms a preference relation which is weakly single-peaked, and incomplete.
Remark 2 The introduction and analysis of the subgame Γ x (s) provides a microfoundation for the assumption that the k-closest agents are serviced by the facility with capacity constraint k when the facility is unable to restrict its services to just k agents (recall the good is non-excludable). In some settings however it may be more natural to assume that a facility can indeed restrict their services to the k-closest agents (and identify them). For example a local-population serving facility, say a community centre, may verify agents' residential addresses before permitting them to use the service. Such a model avoids the subgame Γ x (s) but leads to the same strategic incentives for agents as described in Proposition 2.
We now define our main concept of strategyproofness.
Definition 2 A mechanism M is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) if, for every agent i ∈ N with true location x i ∈ X, we have
Based on the definition of i , the DIC property can equivalently be defined as follows: for every agent i ∈ N with true location x i ∈ X we have
where u i (s, x) is the equilibrium utility attained by agent i in the game Γ x (s). We note that the direct revelation principle does not apply in our setting since the subgame Γ x (s) relies on x being common knowledge among agents.
The following example illustrates the more demanding nature of DIC in the capacitated setting compared to the uncapacitated setting. Specifically we present an example of a mechanism which is DIC in the uncapacitated setting but is not DIC in the capacitated setting; that is, the mechanism is not capacity-robust-DIC.
Example 1 Consider the following dictatorial-style mechanism M which outputs either the location s 1 = 1/4 and s 2 = 3/4 depending on which is closer to a certain agent's report, say agent i. 10 First, notice that when there is no capacity constraint (i.e. k = n) the mechanism is trivially DIC. Agent i's utility is either 1 − |x i − 1 4 | or 1 − |x i − 3 4 | and so truthful reporting is always weakly preferred. Now consider the case where a capacity constraint k < n is present, and suppose agent i has x i = 3/8 and x j = 1/4 for all j i. In this case, truthful reporting leads to the mechanism outputting s 1 = 1/4 and due to the capacity constraint her utility is zero. In contrast, if she misreports somex i ∈ (1/2, 1] the mechanism output will be s 2 = 3/4. In this case she is the closest agent and is strictly better off with utility equal to 1 − | 3 8 − 3 4 |. It follows that the mechanism M is not DIC in the capacity constrained setting and hence is not capacity-robust-DIC.
We also define the unanimity property which is satisfied if whenever all agents report a location s ∈ X then the mechanisms output is s.
Definition 3 (Unanimity) A mechanism M is unanimity respecting if for any profile of reportsx such thatx i = s for all i ∈ N we have
As mentioned earlier the mechanism designer is focused on maximizing social welfare. Formally social welfare is defined as follows: Given a facility location s ∈ X and profile of agents' true locations x ∈ n i=1 X the welfare attained is
whereū i is the utility attained in equilibrium of the game Γ x (s) by agent i (as per Theorem 1 this is constant across all equilibria). The optimal (or maximal) welfare attainable, Π * (x), is the maximum sum of utilities attainable across all agent-to-facility assignments, or allocations, which satisfy the capacity constraint. That is,
However, applying Corollary 1 we can infer that
As will be shown later, the welfare-optimal mechanism is not DIC. Thus, to regain 'truthfulness' (incentive compatibility) we consider approximation of the optimal welfare. The approximation ratio compares the worst-case ratio of the optimal welfare and the welfare produced by the mechanism, across all instances of agent true locations.
Definition 4 [(Worst-case) α-approximation]
We say a DIC mechanism M is an α-approximation if
That is, α is a worst-case guarantee on the optimal welfare to mechanism welfare ratio.
DIC mechanisms: Approximation and characterization
We begin by showing that the welfare-optimal mechanism is not DIC, and then proceed to analyze strategic and approximation properties of the median mechanism. In the next subsection, after characterizing all DIC mechanisms, the median mechanism will be shown to be provide the lowest approximation ratio among all DIC mechanisms for a large range of capacity values k < ⌈(n + 1)/2⌉ and k = n.
Theorem 2 For k {1, n}, the welfare-optimal mechanism is not DIC. For k ∈ {1, n} the welfare-optimal mechanism is DIC.
Proof. We prove the result via contradiction for the specific case where k = n 2 however, similar examples can be constructed for general values of k {1, n}.
Let k = n 2 (for n even) and suppose that the mechanism M always outputs the welfare-optimizing facility location (w.r.t agent true locations) and is also DIC.
To derive a contradiction we consider the following instance of agent true locations x ∈ n i=1 X: Let y 1 = 1/4, y 2 = 3/4, and suppose that k − 1 agents are located at y 1 = 1/4 and k − 1 agents at y 2 = 3/4. Let the two remaining agents, denoted i and j, be located at x i = 0 and x j = 7/8, respectively. This is illustrated below. By assumption the mechanism M is optimal and hence the outcome is M(x) = s = 3/4 leading to the maximal welfare of (k − 1) + 7 8 . Notice that in this outcome agent i attains zero utility (i.e., she is not serviced in any equilibrium of the subgame Γ x (s)); however, by assumption, the mechanism is DIC and so there must not be any strictly profitable deviation agent i. Now consider the alternate instance where agent i is now located at y 1 = 1/4 along with the other k − 1 agents. That is, the agents' true locations are
By the optimality of M the outcome must now be M(x) = s ′ = 1/4 leading to optimal welfare k. Now returning to the original instance of agent true locations x we see that if agent i were to misreport her location asx i = 1/4 the mechanism outputs
In the subgame Γ x (s ′ ) agent i attain utility 3/4 in every equilibrium and hence is a strictly profitable deviation. This contradicts the DIC assumption of the mechanism. We conclude that the optimal mechanism is not DIC.
For k ∈ {1, n}, the result follows from considering the median mechanism (to be defined formally later) (Black, 1948; Moulin, 1980; Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2013) . ⊓ ⊔
Remark 3
In both the capacitated (k < n) and uncapacitated (k = n) settings, the optimal facility location and welfare can be computed in polynomial time.
Formally, the median mechanism is defined as follows.
Definition 5
The median mechanism takes a profile of reportsx and outputs the location corresponding to the ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋th smallest location inx. We denote the mechanism by median(x).
Proposition 3 For any capacity constraint k ≤ n, the median mechanism is DIC.
Proof. For k < n, this result is implied by a more general result (Theorem 6) proven later. For the case of k = n it is a well-known result of Black (1948) ; Moulin (1980) and so we omit the proof. ⊓ ⊔
Theorem 3 The median mechanism is an α-approximation with (asymptotic) bounds
The approximation results are illustrated in Figure 5 Proof. We omit the proof of the lower bound since a later result (Theorem 7) proves the lower bound for a more general class of mechanisms (generalized median mechanisms) which includes the median mechanism. Thus, we desire only to prove the upper bounds on α stated in the theorem statement.
First, we show that over all possible instances of agent true locations and all possible values of k, an upper bound for the worst-case ratio is 2 (a lower upper bound is later provided for k ≥ 4 5 n). Thus, combined with the lower bounds (to be proven in Theorem 7) we see that the lower and upper bounds match for k < ⌈n/2⌉.
Before presenting the proofs we introduce some notation and make some basic inferences. Let x be any profile of agent reports and suppose that the median mechanism outputs the location s ∈ X. By definition of the median mechanism we infer that (1) the location s coincides with at least one agent's location, say agent i, and (2) the remaining n − 1 agents can be partitioned into two disjoint sets N 1 , N 2 of ⌊(n − 1)/2⌋ and ⌈(n − 1)/2⌉ agents with locations in [0, s] and [s, 1], respectively. Now in every equilibria of the game Γ x (s) a set of at most k agents will be serviced by the facility. Furthermore, this equilibrium set of agents produces the maximal welfare attainable from location s (Corollary 1). Thus, to attain a lower bound on the welfare attained from the facility location s, Π median (x), we can simply select any set of at most k agents to be serviced. We begin the proof.
To prove the 2-upper bound we proceed as follows. Consider the (lower bound) welfare attained when ⌊(k − 1)/2⌋ agents from N 1 , ⌈(k − 1)/2⌉ agents from N 2 , and agent i are serviced. This leads to the following
In addition it is clear that the optimal welfare Π * (x) is bounded by k. Thus, we have
We now provide a lower upper bound for the case where k ≥ 4 5 n. Maintaining the notation introduced earlier, we in addition denote the output of the median and optimal mechanism by s, s * , respectively. Given that we wish to determine an upper bound on α, which maximizes the welfare ratio across all location profiles, we can without loss of generality restrict our attention to profiles of agent locations x which leads to outcomes s s * . A simple lower bound of the median mechanism welfare is attained by calculating the welfare attained if the same agents serviced in the equilibria of the game Γ x (s * ) are also serviced when the facility is located at s. Denote the set of agents serviced in Γ x (s * ) equilibria by N * (assume wlog that |N * | = k), then we have
Equivalently, this can be expressed as
Now since s s * we have either s * < s or s * > s. We prove the result for the former case, the latter case follows similarly.
Partition the set of agents N into sets N 0,s] (|s − x| − |s * − x|) − |N * 2 | max x∈ [s,1] (|s − x| − |s * − x|)
. Thus, the previous inequality becomes
Now for the above lower bound of Π median (x) to be used as an upper bound in the ratio
Previously we have shown that Π median (x) ≥ k/2 and so a sufficient condition is for
Thus, for k > 2 3 n + 4 3 we have 
This completes the proof. ⊓ ⊔ Given s ∈ X, an s-constant mechanism is such that M s (x) = s for allx. Clearly any constant mechanism is DIC.
Theorem 4
For all values of k and n, the s-constant mechanism with s = 1 2 is a 2-approximation ratio.
Proof. If the mechanism locates the facility at s = 1 2 , the welfare is no-worse than
Whilst, the welfare of the optimal solution can be no greater than k. It follows that the approximation ratio is never more than 2. Furthermore, it is easy to construct examples where all agents locate at the extreme points x i ∈ {0, 1} to show that the approximation ratio α is at least size 2. That is, the approximation ratio is precisely 2.
⊓ ⊔
It is straightforward to show that among all s-constant mechanisms when s = 1/2 the approximation ratio is minimized. Given that the median mechanism is optimal in the uncapacitated setting, it is interesting to note that for k ≤ ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋ the median mechanism provides an approximation ratio equal to that of the 1/2-constant location mechanism.
A complete characterization of the class of DIC mechanisms
We now present a complete characterization of all DIC mechanisms in the capacitated (k < n) setting. The characterization leverages the powerful result of Border and Jordan (1983) but involves careful analysis of the details which are only present in our capacitated (k < n) model compared to the uncapacitated (k = n) setting studied elsewhere.
The partial characterization of DIC mechanisms provided in Border and Jordan (1983) shows that a large family of DIC mechanisms can be characterized by the uncompromising property. Furthermore, every uncompromising mechanism can be shown to be of a certain form known as a generalized median mechanism (GMM). We state without proof the results of Border and Jordan (1983) below. First we define the uncompromising property.
Informally speaking, a mechanism is said to be uncompromising if agents cannot report extreme locations to influence the outcome in their favor. This is a basic property of the median mechanism.
Definition 6 (Uncompromising mechanism) A mechanism M is uncompromising if for each profile of reportsx and each j with M(x) = s we havê
The result of Border and Jordan (1983) provides a complete characterization of all uncompromising mechanisms via Generalized Median Mechanisms (GMMs).
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This characterization carries over to the capacitated (k < n) setting studied in this paper since the uncompromising property is defined independently of agent utilities. We emphasize however, that this characterization result is in terms of the mechanical property of uncompromisingness rather than strategic (or incentive compatibility) properties. Our contribution, illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 , is to provide an alternate characterization showing that GMMs correspond to the family of DIC mechanism when capacity constraints (k < n) are present.
Before presenting Border and Jordan's result we highlight a technical detail. The equivalence result of Border and Jordan (summarized in Theorem 5 of this paper) is proven for X = R, while in this paper we focus on X = [0, 1]. However, it can be shown that the characterization result equivalently holds for X = [0, 1] -a sketch of this argument can be found in (Schummer and Vohra, 2002, Footnote 8) . We now formally define the family of GMMs.
Definition 7 (Generalized Median Mechanism (GMM))
A mechanism M is said to be a generalized median mechanism (GMM) if for each S ⊆ N, there exists some a S ∈ X such that for allx,
To build some intuition we highlight how some of well-known mechanisms can be formulated as a generalized median mechanism:
(i) The median mechanism is attained from the generalized median mechanism by setting a S = 1 for all subsets S ⊆ N with |S | < ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋ and a S = 0 otherwise. Generalized (ii) The s-constant mechanism for some location s ∈ X is attained by setting a ∅ = s and a S = 1 for all other (non-empty) subsets S ⊆ N. (iii) The agent i dictatorship mechanism is attained by setting a S = 0 for S = {i} and a S = 1 for other subsets S ⊆ N.
Theorem 5 [Border and Jordan (1983)] In both the capacitated (k < n) and uncapacitated (k = n) settings, a mechanism M is uncompromising if and only if it is a generalized median mechanism. Furthermore, for the uncapacitated (k = n) setting (i) Every DIC and unanimity respecting mechanism is a GMM, (ii) Every GMM is DIC.
Below in Figure 2 we illustrate part (ii) of Theorem 5. Figure 3 highlights an implication of our key characterization result (to be stated at the end of this section) and shows that in the capacity constrained, or threshold-rivalrous, setting that the family of DIC collapses into the family of GMMs. , a mechanism is said to be a phantom mechanism if it always returns a location coinciding with either a reportx i or a point p j , i.e.,
12 Each point p j ∈ p is said be a phantom vote, we denote the set of phantom 'voters' by P and the set of agents (as usual) by N. Border and Jordan show that a mechanism M is uncompromising if and only if (i) M = M P for some phantom mechanism with at most 2 n phantom voters, and (ii) M has the closed graph property.
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The following proposition shows that the class of GMMs are DIC in the capacity constrained (k < n) setting. The proof is adapted from (Border and Jordan, 1983 , Proposition 1) which proves the result for the uncapacitated (k = n) setting.
Proposition 4 For any k < n, every GMM is DIC in the capacitated setting.
Proof. For this proof we utilize the equivalence between GMMs and the uncompromising property (Theorem 5).
For the purpose of a contradiction, suppose that M is uncompromising and not DIC. That is, for some agent i ∈ N with true location x i , there exist a profile of other agent true locations x −i , and reportsx −i such that for somex i x i
First note that if s = x i then a contradiction is achieved immediately since s is agent i's most preferred location.
14 12 One special case of phantom voting mechanisms are the median phantom voting mechanisms studied in Moulin (1980) where
. 13 The mechanism M has the closed graph property if for each ℓ ∈ N ∪ P the set {x ∈ X n : ℓ = M(x)} is closed.
14 We note however that agent i still need not be serviced by the facility if ≥ k other agents are also located at s with higher priority rankings. Nonetheless, even in this case s = x i is still (weakly) the most preferred location. Now suppose that s x i . We assume that s < x i (the alternate case is dealt with similarly). Now, by the uncompromising property we know that for allx i ∈ [s, 1] we have M(x i ,x −i ) = s ′ = s, which contradicts Equation 1 and so it must be that x i ∈ [0, s). Now if s < s ′ , then it also follows thatx i < s ′ and by the uncompromising property
But this cannot be true since whenx
the uncompromising property applied to M(x i ,x −i ) = s tells us that s ′ = s which is again a contradiction. Thus, we conclude that s ′ ≤ s < x i and so any deviation from x i tox i x i can only move the location from s to some (weakly) further away location s ′ which is also to the 'left' of x i . Proposition 2 then immediately implies that s i s ′ which contradicts Equation 1, and completes the proof.
⊓ ⊔
The following lemma shows that DIC may be a strictly stronger property in the capacitated (k < n) setting compared to the uncapacitated (k = n) setting. This suggests that the threshold-rivalrous component of the good, or facility, introduces greater incentives for agents to manipulate compared to the public goods setting.
Lemma 1 Let M be a mechanism. If M is DIC for the capacitated (k < n) setting, for some k, then it is DIC for the uncapacitated setting. The converse is not true.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that M is not DIC for the uncapacitated (k = n) setting, we then show that it is not DIC for the capacitated (k < n) setting for any k Now since M is not DIC in the uncapacitated (k = n) setting for some agent i ∈ N there exists some profile of reportsx −i such that
where x i is agent i's true location. We assume that agent i has top priority ranking (⊲), this assumption can be made since the ordering (⊲) is a feature of the induced subgames Γ x (s), Γ x (s ′ ) and the mechanism is independent (or oblivious) of the ordering. First we note that since agent utilities are independent of other agent true locations in the uncapacitated case the above equation holds for any profile of the other agent true locations x −i . This independence property will be leveraged to produce cases where this same deviation leads to strict incentives to deviate from sincere reporting in the capacitated (k < n) case.
Given the independence property, it can be observed that Equation 2 is equivalent to
First note that x i s since otherwise M(x i ,x −i ) = s would be agents i's strictly most preferred outcome -contradicting Equation 2. Thus, x i s, and wlog we assume that x i < s. It then follows from Equation 2 that
We now shift to the capacitated (k < n) case for any k and show that agent i still attains strictly greater utility in this alternate setting for some profile of other agents' true locations. That is, utilizing the independence property (mentioned earlier), we wish to show that there exists some profile of other agent true locations x −i such that Equation 2 holds. To show this we consider two cases (s ′ ≤ x i and s ′ > x i ) with corresponding profiles of other agent locations x −i which ensure that Equation 2 holds.
Case 1: If s ′ ≤ x i then suppose that the true location of all other agents j i are such that x j ≥ x i (i.e, x j = 1 for all j i) then agent i is the (weakly) closest agent to s ′ and attains utility 1 − (x i − s ′ ) > 1 − δ in the capacitated setting for any k. Whilst when reporting sincerely, the facility location is s and agent i's utility is either 0 (if she is not serviced) or 1 − (x i − s) = 1 − δ -in either case misreporting leads to strictly greater utility.
Case 2:If s ′ > x i then suppose that the true location of all other agents j i are such that x j ≤ x i (i.e. x j = 0 for all j i) then agent i is the closest agent to s ′ and attains utility 1 − (s ′ − x i ) > 1 − δ in the capacitated setting for any k. Whilst when reporting sincerely, the facility location is s and agent i's utility is 1 − (s − x i ) = 1 − δ -thus, again misreporting leads to strictly greater utility.
This completes the proof since given Equation 2 which holds in the uncapacitated (k = n) case for every profile of other agent reports x −i , we were able to construct specific profile of reports were Equation 2 also holds in the capacitated (k < n) case for any k.
We omit the proof of the final statement since later we consider a mechanism called the quantile mechanism in detail and show that it is DIC for the uncapacitated (k = n) setting but is not DIC for the capacitated (k < n) setting, for any k (Proposition 5). This then completes the proof.
⊓ ⊔
We now present our key result which provides a complete characterization of DIC mechanisms in the capacitated setting. The result shows that in the capacitated (k < n) setting every DIC mechanism is a GMM. This contrasts with partial characterization of DIC mechanisms provided by GMMs in the uncapacitated (k = n) setting (summarized in Theorem 5).
Before stating the theorem we provide some intuition for why all DIC mechanisms can be described via GMMs in the capacitated setting (as modeled in this paper with the second stage subgame Γ x (s)) but in the uncapacitated setting cannot. The argument is as follows: Given a DIC mechanism in the capacitated setting we wish to prove that it must satisfy the uncompromising property and hence must be a GMM (recall the equivalence of GMMs and this property). This is to prove that an agent truthfully reporting a location x i to the 'right' of the mechanism output s ∈ X (s < x i ) cannot affect the mechanism output by reporting another locationx i which is also to the right of s without violating DIC. To attain such a violation we note that the DIC requirement in the capacitated setting implies that for any profile of reports of other agentsx −i and any profile of true locations of other agents x −i misreporting is never strictly profitable. It then suffices to suppose that the uncompromising property is violated and construct various instances of other agent true locations x −i such that, due to the capacity constraint, agent i finds it strictly profitable to misreport her location. The key ingredient unique to the capacitated setting which produces this characterization result is that given two mechanism outputs s, s ′ ∈ X even if x i is closer to s than s ′ , if s < x i < s ′ it may be that the location s ′ is strictly preferred to s. In particular, if all other other agents are located at s then due to the capacity constraint, or threshold rivalry, of the facility she will strictly prefer the location s ′ .
Theorem 6 In the capacitated (k < n) setting, a mechanism M is DIC if and only if it a GMM.
Proof. One direction has been proven in Proposition 4. We prove that when k < n, every DIC mechanism is uncompromising which suffices in proving that the mechanism is a GMM. Let M be a mechanism which is DIC for some k < n. Consider an instance where i ∈ N is an arbitrary agent with true location x i , andx −i is some profile of other agent reports, leading to outcome
for some s x i (if no such profile exists then agent i's report dictates the location s and hence the mechanism is trivially uncompromising). Wlog assume that s < x i . Now since M is DIC (for some k < n) it must be that for any true location of the other agents N\{ j} agent i never strictly profits from misreporting her location.
Suppose that the agents in N\{i} have true location x j = s. Then agent i's utility under truthful reporting is zero since she is not serviced in any equilibrium of the subgame Γ x (s) (recalling that k < n). Now consider a misreport by agent i, witĥ x i ≥ s, leading to outcome
We wish to show that s ′ = s which suffices to show that M is uncompromising. If s ′ ∈ ( s+x i 2 , 1] then agent i is the closest agent (recall x j = s for all j i) and hence is serviced, this leads to positive utility and contradicts the DIC property. Note that due to the capacity constraint and the fact that agent i is not serviced when reporting truthfully, this contradiction is attained even in the case where the location s ′ is further away from agent i's true location than location s (i.e. s ′ ∈ (x i + x i −s 2 , 1]. Given this contradiction, we conclude it must be that s ′ ∈ [0, s) ∪ {s} ∪ (s,
2 ] then if we consider the alternate setting where all agents in N\{i} have true location in x j = 1 ≥ x i and if agent i has top priority (⊲) the original (truthful) report leads to agent i being serviced. In this instance her utility is 1−|s− x i |. Now if she instead misreport from x i tox i this leads to a strict increase in utility since the location s ′ is closer and agent i is still serviced. In summary, the above shows that s ′ ∈ [0, s) ∪ {s}. Now suppose that s ′ ∈ [0, s) and suppose that instead agent i's true location is x * i =x i , i.e., the same previous misreport considered form agent i. If all other agents are located at x j = 1 then (recalling Equation 4) under truthful reporting when other agents reportx −i leads to outcome
In this outcome agent i's utility isū
= 1 − (x * i − s ′ ) since s ′ < s ≤ x * i :=x i . But by misreporting tox * i = x i ,
as per Equation 3, this leads to outcome
In this outcome agent i's utility is 1 − (x * i − s) >ū. This contradicts the fact that the mechanism is DIC and so we conclude that s ′ [0, s) and hence s ′ = s as required. Thus, we have shown that for an arbitrary agent and any profile of reports that if DIC is satisfied then the uncompromising property is also satisfied. It follows from (Border and Jordan, 1983) then that every DIC mechanism for k < n is a generalized median-location mechanism.
Remark 5
The above results combined show that in general a DIC mechanism in the uncapacitated (k = n) setting is not DIC in the capacitated (k < n) setting. However, every DIC mechanism in the uncapacitated (k = n) setting which is also unanimity respecting is DIC in the capacitated (k < n) setting. This follows since every DIC and unanimity respecting mechanism is a GMM (recall Theorem 5). Thus, when a mechanism is required to be unanimity respecting then DIC is equivalent in the both the capacitated and uncapacitated settings.
The following corollary is a summary of our equivalence results.
Corollary 2 Let M be a mechanism. The following are equivalent: (i) M is a GMM (ii) M is DIC in the capacitated (k < n) setting for some k. (iii) M is DIC in the capacitated (k ≤ n) setting for every k.

Approximation bounds of DIC mechanisms
Utilizing the characterization result of DIC mechanisms for the capacitated (k < n) setting via GMMs we provide a lower bound on the approximation ratio for all DIC mechanisms.
Theorem 7
In the capacitated (k < n) setting, every DIC is an α-approximation with (asymptotic) bounds
These lower bounds are illustrated in Figure 4 . For 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌈(n + 1)/2⌉ or k = n, the median mechanism is optimal among all such mechanisms with respect to the approximation ratio. Proof. Let M be an DIC mechanism and let ε be any positive real number. Given the previous characterization we know that M satisfies the uncompromising property. Now consider an instance where all n agents have distinct locations x in the interval I = ( 
Whilst the optimal welfare is attained by locating at s * = 1 giving welfare k. Thus, the approximation ratio α is at least
Case 2: s ∈ I. There are two possibilities one that s = x i for some i (necessarily unique), or s x i for any i. Both cases are dealt with similarly and do not affect the approximation ratio as k, n grows.
In either possibility, if each agent to the left moves to 0 and each agent to the right moves to 1, by uncompromising property it must be that in this new profile x ′ we still have M(x ′ ) = s. Let the parameters λ 1 , λ 2 denote the number of agents located at 0 and 1, respectively. Note that it may be the case that an additional agent is located at s (in which case λ 1 + λ 2 = n − 1). But now if x ′ were the agents' true locations we still have M(x ′ ) = s. And the welfare from the uncompromising mechanism M is
|s − x|)
Now the optimal welfare can be calculated for two distinct cases. If k ≤ ⌈(n + 1)/2⌉ then since either λ 1 ≥ ⌈(n − 1)/2⌉ ≥ (k − 1) or λ 2 ≥ ⌈(n − 1)/2⌉ ≥ (k − 1) and so the optimal welfare is attained by locating at either s * = 0 or s * = 1 depending on whether or not s = x i for some i ∈ N. In either a lower bound on the optimal welfare is
Thus, the approximation ratio is no smaller than
If k > ⌈(n + 1)/2⌉ then the optimal welfare is
Thus, the approximation is no smaller than
This completes the proof. ⊓ ⊔
Remark 6
Since the complete family of DIC mechanisms is described by the family of GMMs it follows that for any given capacity constraint k < n the lowest α-approximation DIC mechanism is a GMM. Furthermore, for k = n it is well-known (see for example Procaccia and Tennenholtz (2013) ) that the median mechanism (a member of GMMs) is optimal among all mechanism with an α = 1-approximation ratio. Thus, for each k ≤ n a GMMs provides the lowest α-approximation among all DIC mechanisms.
Improved approximation bounds via ex post IC mechanisms
The previous results have shown that the requirement of dominant strategy incentive compatibility generates an α-approximation ratio of at best 2 when k ≤ ⌈(n + 1)/2⌉. Naturally, we consider a weaker concept of strategyproofness and analyze the approximation ratio of a mechanisms within this family. The mechanism considered provides an improved approximation bound of 4 3 for the capacity ranges k ≤ ⌈(n + 1)/2⌉, and continues to guarantee strictly lower approximation for all k < ( √ 17 + 1) n/8 compared to any DIC mechanism. The weaker strategyproof concept we study is ex post incentive compatible (ex post IC). Informally, the ex post IC property ensures that truthful reporting is an equilibrium. We begin with a formal definition.
That is, an agent can do no better ex post than truthfully reporting if all other agents truthfully report.
Remark 7
In the uncapacitated (k = n) setting DIC and ex post IC are equivalent properties. In the capacitated (k < n) setting this is no longer true and ex post IC may be a strictly weaker property.
We now introduce a mechanism which we call the quantile mechanism which is ex post IC but is not DIC. The mechanism can intuitively be understood as a majority vote between the locations s 1 = 1/4 and s 2 = 3/4, and is a special case of the duple mechanisms studied in Gibbard (1977) .
Definition 9 (Quantile Mechanism) The quantile mechanism is the following function
Remark 8
The quantile mechanism is not a generalized median mechanism (GMM). This follows from the violation of the uncompromising property (an explicit example of this violation is illustrated within the proof of Theorem 8). It then follows immediately from our previous characterization result that the mechanism is not DIC in the capacitated setting for any k < n.
Proposition 5
The quantile mechanism is DIC for k = n but is not DIC for any k < n.
Proof. When k = n the mechanism is trivially DIC since it is equivalent to a plurality (or majority) vote over two alternatives. Thus we omit a formal proof of this claim and instead provide an example showing that the mechanism is not DIC for any k < n.
Let k < n and consider a specific agent i ∈ N with x i = 3/8. Now suppose that all other agents j i are located at x j = 1/4 with ⌈n/2⌉ − 1 such agents reportinĝ x j ∈ [0, 1/2) and the remaining ⌊n/2⌋ agents reportingx j ∈ [1/2, 1]. It follows that by truthfully reportingx i = x i the outcome of the mechanism will be 1/4 and her utility will be zero since every other agent is closer to the facility than her. Whilst if she misreportx i ∈ [1/2, 1] the outcome will be 3/4 and she will be the closest agent and shall attain utility 1 − |3/8 − 3/4| > 0. Thus, agent i strictly prefers to misreport her location and the mechanism is not DIC.
Theorem 8
The quantile mechanism is ex post IC for all k ⌊n/2⌋. For k = ⌊n/2⌋ the mechanism is not ex post IC.
Proof. Case 1: k ⌊n/2⌋ Suppose for the purpose of a contradiction that for some agent i ∈ N there exists x
s. Denote the profiles by x ′ and x, respectively.
First note that a single agent i ∈ N can change the outcome only in two instances:
(1) x i < 1/2 and precisely ⌈n/2⌉ agents (including i) have x j < 1/2. In this case, when i reports truthfully, the outcome is s = 1/4. The outcome changes to s ′ = 3/4 if and only if agent i misreports some location x
(2) x i ≥ 1/2 and precisely ⌈n/2⌉ − 1 agents have x j < 1/2. In this case, when i reports truthfully, the outcome is s = 3/4. The outcome changes to s ′ = 1/4 if and only if agent i misreports some location
We begin with instance (1) where ⌊n/2⌋ agents are located in [1/2, 1]. If k < ⌊n/2⌋ then agent i is never serviced under the (strategic) deviation which leads to outcome s ′ = 3/4 since at least k agents are closer to the facility than her. Thus, the deviation can not be strictly profitable. Alternatively, if k > ⌊n/2⌋ then under truthful reporting she is always serviced by the facility since precisely ⌈n/2⌉ ≤ k agents are within distance < 1/4 of the facility. If she instead deviates leading to outcome s ′ = 3/4 she is either serviced by the facility which is now further away d(s ′ , x i ) > 1/4, or she is not serviced. In either case she attains strictly lower utility. Now consider instance (2) where ⌈n/2⌉ − 1 agents are located in [0, 1/2). If k < ⌊n/2⌋ then agent i is never serviced under the (strategic) deviation which leads to outcome s ′ = 1/4 since at least k ≤ ⌊n/2⌋ − 1 ≤ ⌈n/2⌉ − 1 are closer to the facility than her. Thus, the deviation can not be strictly profitable. Alternatively, if k > ⌊n/2⌋ then under truthful reporting she is always serviced since precisely ⌊n/2⌋ + 1 ≤ k agents are located in (1/2, 1]. If she instead deviates leading to the outcome s ′ = 1/4 she is either serviced by the facility which is now further away d(s ′ , x i ) > 1/4, or she is not serviced. In either case she attains strictly lower utility.
Case 2: k = ⌊n/2⌋. Consider the case where n = 5 and so k = 2. Assume priority ordering for the tie-breaking as 5 ⊲ 4 ⊲ 3 ⊲ 2 ⊲ 1, and let the location profile be x = (0, 0, 1/2, 1, 1).
Under truthful reporting the location is s = 3/4 and agent 3 due to priority ordering attains utility zero since she is not serviced. Now consider the deviation of voter 3 to x ′ 3 = 1/2 − ε for any ε ∈ (0, 1/2], then the allocation is s ′ = 1/4 -furthermore since her priority is higher than the other equidistant agents 1, 2 she is serviced. Thus, her utility under the deviation is 3/4 which is strictly profitable.
⊓ ⊔
We now bound the approximation ratio of the quantile mechanism. We emphasize that these improved approximation ratios (for the capacity ranges k < 1 8 ( √ 17 + 1) n) are attained at the expense of the stronger strategyproofness concept of DIC.
Theorem 9
The quantile mechanism is an α-approximation where
For k = ⌊n/2⌋ the mechanism is not ex post IC and so the α-approximation is not defined. Figure 5 illustrates these approximation bounds along with the previous approximation bounds of the median mechanism (which has a lower bound which applies to all DIC mechanisms).
Proof. First we show that a lower bound on α is 4/3 for any k ⌊n/2⌋ (when k = ⌊n/2⌋ the mechanism is not ex post IC and so the approximation ratio is not well-defined). We then show for ranges k < ⌊n/2⌋ there is a matching upper bound, and then we provide bounds for the remaining values of k. Claim 2: α ≤ 4/3 for k < ⌊n/2⌋. Consider an arbitrary profile of agent locations x and let M Q (x) = s ∈ {1/4, 3/4}. If s = 1/4 then at least ⌈n/2⌉ > k agents are located in [0, 1/2) thus the welfare is bounded below by the welfare attained if only agents located in this interval are serviced (i.e. we apply Corollary 1). This leads to the following lower bound
Similarly, if s = 3/4 then at least ⌊n/2⌋ + 1 > k agents are located in [1/2, 1] and the same lower bound on welfare Π Q (x) is attained. However, the maximum welfare attainable by the optimal solution is k. It follows that
Claim 3: α ≥ 1 + k n+k for k > ⌊n/2⌋ (as k, n grow). Consider an instance where ⌈n/2⌉ agents locate at 1/2 and ⌊n/2⌋ agents locate at 1. In this case the quantile mechanism locates the facility at s = 1/4 and the welfare attained is
In contrast the optimal mechanism locates the facility at s * = 1/2 this leads to welfare
Thus, we have a lower bound for the approximation ratio
. Let x be an arbitrary instance of agent locations and denote the quantile mechanisms output by s ∈ {1/4, 3/4}. If s = 1/4 then at least ⌈n/2⌉ agents are located in [0, 1/2) and the remaining agents are located in [1/2, 1]. Let λ 1 , λ 2 denote the number of agents in these respective intervals.
Applying Corollary 1, we attain a lower bound on the welfare of the quantile mechanism by assuming that all min{λ 1 , k} agents from the interval [0, 1/2) are serviced by the facility. That is,
Similarly, if s = 3/4 we attain Π Q (x) ≥ 1 4 k + 1 4 n + 1. Thus, using the upper bound of k, on the optimal welfare we attain
This completes the proof. ⊓ ⊔ Corollary 3 For any k < 1 8 (1 + √ 17) n, the quantile mechanism provides an approximation ratio strictly lower than any DIC mechanism. Figure 5 illustrates the approximation ratio bounds of the median mechanism and the quantile mechanism. Note that the lower bound of the median mechanism is a lower bound for any DIC mechanism. As previously mentioned, the quantile mechanism is a special case of the duple mechanism considered in Gibbard (1977) . Stated simply a duple mechanism restricts the mechanism's range to just two possible facility locations and outputs the location which is preferred by the majority (i.e. a majority vote). A natural question is whether improved approximation bounds can be attained by choosing different locations and/or considering more than two alternatives. Thus, we present the following remarks.
Remark 9 Among the family of duple mechanisms whereby the the output is restricted to just two alternatives the choice of these two locations as 1/4 and 3/4 are optimal in terms of the approximation ratio.
Remark 10 If a mechanism has countable range and includes (strictly) more than two possible facility locations majority voting need not produce an outcome and so it is necessary to consider alternate voting rules. For many well-known voting rules it is easy to show that DIC will be violated in some instances. More generally, it follows from Young (1975) that if a positional scoring rule is applied DIC will be violated.
We conclude this section with the following remark concerning the unanimity property.
Remark 11 Often unanimity is considered a major desideratum of a mechanism. The quantile mechanism we presented here does not satisfy unanimity. However, a simple modification can be made to the mechanism to ensure unanimity is satisfied without affecting the approximation ratio and maintaining ex post IC for all k {⌊n/2⌋, n}.
Extension to an excludable good
In this section we consider an extension of our framework where the good is excludable. That is, we consider a setting where the mechanism designer has the ability to issue permits which restricts access to the facility to only a subset of at most k agents.
We formally define the more general mechanisms as location-allocation mechanisms.
Definition 10 A location-allocation mechanism M A is a function
The set of agents A have exclusive access to the facility (say via permits)
In the previous non-excludability model the mechanisms output was only a facility location, s ∈ X, and this then induced a subgame Γ x (s). In this new setting, the allocation A determined by the mechanism reduces the subgame since every agent in A has a weakly dominant strategy to attempt (and successfully) be serviced by the facility and every agent not in A has a weakly dominant strategy to not attempt to be serviced. We omit details of the equilibria analysis but it is easy to show that (1) there exists an equilibrium where all agents in A are serviced by the facility and all other agents do not travel to the facility location, (2) all equilibria return the same welfare, and (3) in every equilibrium every agent attains the same utility.
Thus, under a location-allocation-mechanism with M A (x) = (s, A) the welfare generated (in any equilibrium) is Π(s, A) = i∈A 1 − d(s, x i ).
Remark 12
In the previous non-excludable setting agent allocations were determined by equilibria of the subgame Γ x (s). In the notation introduced above this corresponds to the set A equaling the set of k-closest agents to s (breaking ties using the priority ordering), say N * . In the excludability setting studied here, a mechanism can only set A = N * if the mechanism is strategyproof since identifying the set N * requires information of agent true locations.
We now show that no 'reasonable' location-allocation-mechanism is DIC or ex post IC. In particular, we only enforce one criteria which is a weak form of anonymity. Informally speaking, we require that the location-allocation mechanism assigns individuals independently of their label if their report is distinct from all other agents.
Note that the usual definition of anonymity is not directly applicable since with a deterministic mechanism, if all agents report identical locations the mechanism must discriminate against n − k agents who will not be allocated the services of the facility.
Definition 11 [Allocation-anonymous (in the absence of ties)]
Let M A be a location-allocation mechanism and letx be any profile of reports such that there exists i ∈ N withx i x j for all j i, and denote the corresponding mechanism outcome by M A (x) = (s, N ′ ). The mechanism M A is said to be allocation anonymous (in the absence of ties) if for any modified profilex ′ attained by settingx Remark 13 Dictatorial rules are not allocation-anonymous (in the absence of ties).
We now show that if we restrict our attention to allocation-anonymous mechanisms there is no strategyproof (ex post IC not DIC) mechanism which decides both the location of the facility and the subset of (at most) k agents to be serviced by the facility.
Theorem 10 In the capacitated (k < n) setting, any location-allocation-mechanism M A which is allocation-anonymous is not ex post IC and hence also not DIC, for any k.
Proof. We prove that no such ex post IC mechanism exists which implies that no DIC mechanism exist. Suppose for the purpose of a contradiction that M A is a ex post IC and allocation-anonymous mechanism.
First consider an instance x where x i = 3/4 for all i ∈ N, and denote the output of the mechanism by M A (x) = (s, N 1 ) for some s ∈ X and some non-empty subset N 1 of size at most k. Let i * be some agent such that i * ∈ N 1 and j * some agent such that j * N 1 . In this outcome agent j * attains utility zero, since j * N 1 . Now consider the modified setting where agent j * deviates tox j * = 1/2, denote the outcome by M A (x j * , x − j * ) = (s ′ , N 2 ). We consider two cases:
Case 1: suppose j * ∈ N 2 . In this case agent j * 's utility is now 1 − d(s ′ , 3 4 ) > 0 for all s ′ ∈ X and is a strictly profitable deviation which would contradicts the ex post IC assumption. Thus, case 1 must not be the case.
Case 2: suppose j * N 2 . Now consider the modified instance of locations where agent i * has true location x ′ i * = 1/2 and agent j * has true location x ′ j * = 3/4 (and all other candidates unchanged at 3/4). In this setting, when all agents report truthfully the mechanism outcome is M A (x ′ ) = (s ′′ , N 3 ), and it must be that i * N 3 , by the allocation-anonymous (in the absence of ties) property. This follows since before the swap we had j * N 2 and x j * was distinct in the original profile. Hence we infer that agent i * attains utility zero. But now if agent i * misreports/deviates tox 2 ) > 0. Thus, again we have derived a contradiction. We conclude that no such location-allocation-mechanism exists. ⊓ ⊔
The above impossibility result allows us to infer that the extensive form approach taken in the main body of this paper is crucial for non-dictatorial style mechanisms in the location and allocation of capacity constrained facilities. In particular, the use of an extensive form game and corresponding equilibria outcomes to decide the allocation of agents to the facility reduces the incentive compatibility constraints faced by the mechanism designer. Furthermore, the result suggests that the excludability of the good presents a greater challenge for incentive compatibility than rivalry.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we initiated the study of mechanism design without money for common goods. The model we considered explicitly captures the mechanism design problem of providing a public good which is capacity constrained and hence thresholdrivalrous. The presence of the capacity constraint is shown to induce an additional strategic environment which we model as an extensive form game and leads to an interdependence of agent utilities.
Our key result characterizes all DIC mechanisms and allowed us to provide approximation bounds for all DIC mechanisms. We showed that the median mechanism provides the lowest approximation bounds for capacity ranges k < ⌈(n + 1)/2⌉ and k = n among the class of DIC mechanism. We then provided two extensions: firstly we considered a weaker form of incentive compatibility (ex post IC) and showed that a lower approximation ratio can be achieved for certain capacity ranges (k < 1 8 ( √ 17 + 1) n), second we considered the related problem where the mechanism design can exclude agents from accessing the good.
